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Abstract—Information hiding is a general concept which 
refers to the goal of preventing an adversary to infer secret 
information from the observables. Anonymity and Information 
Flow are examples o f this notion. We study the problem of 
information hiding in systems characterized by the presence 
of randomization and concurrency. It is well known that the 
raising of nondeterminism, due to the possible interleavings and 
interactions of the parallel components, can cause unintended 
information leaks. One way to solve this problem is to fix the 
strategy of the scheduler beforehand. In this work, we propose a 
milder restriction on the schedulers, and we define the notion of 
strong (probabilistic) information hiding under various notions 
of observables. Furthermore, we propose a method, based on 
the notion o f automorphism, to verify that a system satisfies the 
property of strong information hiding, namely strong anonymity 
or no-intereference, depending on the context.
I. In t r o d u c t io n
The problem  o f inform ation hiding consists in  trying to 
prevent the adversary to infer confidential inform ation from  
the observables. Instances o f  this issue are Anonym ity and 
Inform ation Flow. In  bo th  fields there is a growing interest in 
the quantitative aspects, see fo r instance [20], [2], [10], [12], 
[8], [31]. This is justified by the fact that often we have some 
a priori knowledge about the likelihood o f  the various secrets, 
and by the fact that protocols often use random ized actions 
to obfuscate the link betw een secret and observable, like in  
anonym ity protocols such as the D C N ets [9], Crowds [26], 
O nion R outing [32], and Freenet [11].
In a concurrent setting, like in  the case o f  m ulti-agent 
systems, there is also another source o f  uncertainty, w hich 
derives from  the fact that the various entities may inter­
leave and interact in  ways that are usually unpredictable, 
either because they depend on factors that are too com plex 
to analyze, o r because (in the case o f  specifications) they 
are im plem entation-dependent. This uncertainty is com monly 
m odeled as nondeterminism.
The form al analysis o f  systems w hich exhibit probabilistic 
and nondeterm inistic behavior usually involves the use o f 
schedulers, w hich are functions that select, fo r each path, only 
one possible (probabilistic) transition, thus delivering a purely 
probabilistic execution tree.
In  the area o f security, there is the problem  that am ong all 
possible schedulers there are also those w hich take different 
decisions depending on the secret values, and these decisions 
may induce different observable behaviors, thus leaking the 
secret. Hence the security properties are usually violated if  we
consider all possible schedulers: “obviously secure” protocols 
are not secure anymore. This is a w ell know n problem  for 
w hich various solutions have already been  proposed. We will 
com e back to these in  the “Related w ork” section.
A. Contribution
The m ain contribution o f  this w ork consists in  the following:
• We define a class o f  partial-inform ation schedulers, w hich 
we call admissible. These are a restricted version o f  the 
standard (full-inform ation) schedulers. The restriction is 
rather flexible and has strong structural properties, w hich 
facilitate the reasoning about security properties. In  short, 
our systems consist o f  parallel com ponents w ith  certain 
restrictions on the secret and nondeterm inistic choices. 
The scheduler selects the next com ponent (or com po­
nents, in  case o f  synchronization) fo r the subsequent step 
independently o f  the secret choices. We then formalize 
the notion o f  quantitative inform ation leakage under this 
restricted notion o f  scheduler.
• We propose alternative definitions to the property of 
strong anonym ity defined in  [2]. The differences of 
our proposal are: ( 1) the system  should be strongly 
anonym ous fo r all adm issible schedulers instead o f  all 
schedulers, and (2) we consider several variants o f  ad­
versaries, nam ely (in  increasing level o f  power): external 
adversaries, internal adversaries, and adversaries in  collu­
sion w ith the scheduler. Additionally, we use adm issible 
schedulers to extend the notions o f  multiplicative [31] and 
additive leakage [3] to the case o f  concurrent system.
• We propose a sufficient technique to prove probabilis­
tic strong anonymity, and probabilistic noninterference, 
based on  automorphisms. The idea is the following: In  the 
purely nondeterm inistic setting, the strong anonym ity o f 
a system  is often defined and proved as follows: take two 
users A  and B  and a trace in  w hich user A  is ‘the culprit’. 
Now find a trace that looks the same to the adversary, but 
in  w hich user B  is ‘the culprit’ [20], [16], [23], [21]. This 
new trace is often m ost easily obtained by switching the 
behavior of A  and B . N on-interference can be proved in  
the same way (where A  and B  are high inform ation and 
the trace is the low inform ation).
In  this work, we develop this technique fo r systems where 
probability and nondeterm inism  coexist, and we need to 
cope w ith the restrictions on  the schedulers. We form alize
2the notion o f  switching the behaviors o f  A  and B  in  terms 
o f  the existence o f  an  autom orphism  betw een A  and B , 
and then we show that the existence o f  an  autom orphism  
implies strong anonymity.
• We use the D ining Cryptographers [9] to illustrate the 
problem  caused by full-inform ation schedulers, our so­
lution based on  adm issible schedulers, and our proving 
technique.
B. Related Work
The problem  o f the full-inform ation scheduler has already 
been  extensively investigated in  literature. The w orks [4] 
and [5] consider probabilistic autom ata and introduce a re­
striction on  the scheduler to the purpose o f  m aking them  
suitable to applications in  security. Their approach is based 
on dividing the actions o f  each com ponent o f  the system  in  
equivalence classes ( tasks). The order o f  execution o f  different 
tasks is decided in  advance by  a so-called task scheduler. 
The rem aining nondeterm inism  w ithin a task is resolved by 
a second scheduler, w hich models the standard adversarial 
scheduler o f  the cryptographic community. This second entity 
has lim ited knowledge about the other components: it sees 
only the inform ation that they com m unicate during execution. 
Their notion o f  task scheduler is sim ilar to our notion o f 
adm issible scheduler, but more restricted since the strategy 
o f  the task scheduler is decided entirely before the execution.
The w ork in  [7], [6] is sim ilar to ours in  spirit, but in  a 
sense dual from  a technical point o f  view. Instead o f  defining 
a restriction on  the class o f  schedulers, they provide a way 
to specify that a choice is transparent to the scheduler. They 
achieve this by  introducing labels in  process terms, used to 
represent bo th  the states o f  the execution tree and the next 
action or step to be scheduled. They make two states indistin­
guishable to schedulers, and hence the choice betw een them  
private, by associating to them  the same label. Furtherm ore, 
their “equivalence classes” (schedulable actions w ith  the same 
label) can change dynamically, because the same action can 
be associated to different labels during the execution.
In [1] we extend the fram ew ork presented here by allowing 
internal nondeterm inism  and adding a  second type o f  scheduler 
to resolve it, to the aim  o f investigating angelic vs dem onic 
nondeterm inism  in  equivalence-based properties.
The fact that full-inform ation schedulers are unrealistic 
has also been  observed in  fields other than security. First 
attem pts used restricted schedulers in  order to obtain rules 
fo r com positional reasoning [14]. The justification fo r those 
restricted schedulers is the same as for ours, namely, that 
not all inform ation is available to all entities in  the system. 
However that w ork considers a synchronous parallel com ­
position, so the setting is rather different from  ours. Later 
on, it was show n that m odel checking is unfeasible in  its 
general form  fo r the restricted schedulers in  [14] (see [18] and, 
more recently, [17]). D espite o f  undecidability, not all results 
concerning such schedulers have been  negative as, fo r instance, 
the technique o f  partial-order reduction can be im proved by 
assum ing that schedulers can only use partial inform ation [19].
To the best o f  our knowledge, this is the first w ork using 
autom orphism s as a sound p roof technique to prove strong
anonym ity and non-interference. The closest line o f  work 
we are aware o f  is in  the field o f  m odel checking, where 
isom orphism s have been  used to identify sym m etries in  the 
system  and exploited to alleviate the state space explosion 
(see fo r instance [22]).
C. Plan o f the paper
Looking ahead, after reviewing some prelim inaries (Sec­
tion  II) we form alize the notions o f  systems and com ponents 
(Section III). In  Section IV  we present adm issible schedulers. 
We then form alize the notions o f  internal and external strong 
anonym ity in  a probabilistic and nondeterm inistic setting for 
adm issible schedulers (Section V). Finally, we tu rn  our atten­
tion  to the verification problem , in  Section VI we present a 
strong-anonym ity proving technique based on autom orphism s. 
We conclude and outline som e future w ork in  Section VII.
II. P r e l im in a r ie s
In  this section we gather prelim inary notions and results 
related to probabilistic autom ata [29], [28].
A. Probabilistic automata
A function ^ : Q a  [0,1] is a discrete probability distri­
bution on  a set Q if  J2q£Q M q) =  1. The set o f  all discrete 
probability distributions on  Q is denoted by D (Q ).
A  probabilistic automaton is a  quadruple M  =  (Q, E, q, 0) 
where Q is a countable set o f  states, E  a finite set o f  actions, q 
the initial state, and 0 a  transition function 0 : Q a  P ( D ( E  x 
Q )). Here P ( X ) is the set o f  all subsets o f  X .
If  0(q) =  0, then q is a  terminal state. We write q A ^  
fo r ^  e  0(q), q e  Q. M oreover, we write q A r  fo r q, r  e  Q 
w henever q ^ ^  and ^ (a ,  r )  >  0. A  fully probabilistic automa­
ton is a probabilistic autom aton satisfying |0 (q)| <  1 fo r all 
states. In  case 0(q) =  0 in  a fully probabilistic automaton, we 
w ill overload notation and use 0 (q) to denote the distribution 
outgoing from  q. A  path in  a probabilistic autom aton is a 
sequence a  =  q0 A  q1 A  • • • where q® e  Q, a* e  E  and 
q® A ^ i + i .  A  path  can be finite in  w hich case it ends w ith  a 
state. A  path  is complete if  it is either infinite or finite ending in 
a term inal state. G iven a path  a ,  first (a )  denotes its first state, 
and if  a  is finite then last (a )  denotes its last state. A  cycle is 
a  path  a  such that last (a )  =  first (a ) . L et P a th s q ( M ) denote 
the set o f  all paths, Paths*q ( M ) the set o f  all finite paths, and 
C P a th sq( M ) the set o f  all com plete paths o f  an autom aton 
M , starting from  the state q. We w ill om it q if  q =  q. Paths 
are ordered by the prefix relation, w hich we denote by <  . 
The trace o f  a path  is the sequence o f  actions in  E* U E TO 
obtained by rem oving the states, hence fo r the above path  a  
we have trace (a ) =  a 1a 2 . . . .  I f  E ' C E, then trace •%> (a )  is 
the projection o f  trace(a) on  the elem ents o f  E '.
Let M  =  (Q, E, q, 0) be a (fully) probabilistic automaton, 
q e  Q a state, and let a  e  P a th s , ( M ) be a  finite path 
starting in  q. The cone generated by a  is the set o f  com plete 
paths (a) =  { a ' e  C P a th sq( M ) | a  <  a '} .  G iven a fully 
probabilistic autom aton M  =  (Q, E, q, 0) and a state q, we 
can calculate the probability value, denoted by P q(a ) , of
3any finite path  a  starting in  q as follows: P q (q) =  1 and
P q (a  A  q ') =  P q (a ) ^ (a , q '), where last (a )  ^
def
L et =  C P a th sq( M ) be the sample space, and let 
be the sm allest a-a lgebra  generated by the cones. Then P q 
induces a  unique probability measure on  (which we will 
also denote by P q) such that P q ( ( a ) ) =  P q (a ) fo r every finite 
path  a  starting in  q. F or q =  q we write P  instead o f  P$.
A  (full-inform ation) scheduler fo r a probabilistic autom aton 
M  is a fu n c tio n  Z : P a th s * (M ) ^  ( D ( E x Q ) U { ± |)  such that 
fo r all finite paths a ,  if  6(last(a ))  =  0 then Z(a) G 6(last(a )), 
and Z(a) =  ±  otherwise. Hence, a scheduler Z selects one o f 
the available transitions in  each state, and determ ines therefore 
a fully probabilistic automaton, obtained by pruning from  M  
the alternatives that are not chosen by Z. Note that a scheduler 
is history dependent since it can take different decisions for 
the same state s according to the past evolution o f  the system.
B. Noisy Channels
This section briefly recalls the notion o f  noisy channels from  
Inform ation Theory [13].
A  noisy channel is a tuple C =  (X , Y , P H O )  where 
X  =  { x 1; x 2, . . . ,  x n } is a finite set o f  input values, m odeling 
the secrets o f  the channel, and Y  =  {y 1,y 2, . . .  ,y m } is a 
finite set o f  output values, the observables o f  the channel. 
For xj G X  and y¿ G Y , P  (y¿ | x*) is the conditional 
probability o f  obtaining the output y¿ given that the input is x*. 
These conditional probabilities constitute the so called channel 
matrix, where P  (y¿ |x*) is the elem ent a t the intersection o f  the 
¿-th row and the j - th  column. F or any input distribution P X 
on X , P X and the channel m atrix determ ine a jo in t probability 
P A on  X  x Y , and the corresponding m arginal probability P Y 
on Y  (and hence a random  variable Y ). P X is also called a 
priori distribution and it is often denoted by n. The probability 
o f  the input given the output is called a posteriori distribution.
C. Information leakage
We recall here the definitions o f  multiplicative leakage 
proposed in  [31], and o f  additive leakage proposed in  [3]1. 
We assume given a noisy channel C =  (X , Y , P (  | )) and 
a random  variable X  on X . The a priori vulnerability o f 
the secrets in  X  is the probability o f  guessing the right 
secret, defined as V(X) d=f m a x xeX P X (x). The rationale 
behind this definition is that the adversary’s best bet is on  the 
secret w ith  highest probability. The a posteriori vulnerability 
o f the secrets in  X  is the probability o f  guessing the right 
secret, after the output has been  observed, averaged over 
the probabilities o f  the observables. The form al definition
def
is V(X | Y) =  Y^yey  P y  (y )m a x Kex  P  (x | y). Again, this 
definition is based on  the principle that the adversary will 
choose the secret w ith  the highest a posteriori probability.
N ote that, using Bayes theorem , we can write the a  pos­
teriori vulnerability in  term s o f  the channel m atrix and the a
*The notion proposed by Smith in [31] was given in a (equivalent) 
logarithmic form, and called simply leakage. For uniformity sake we use 
here the terminology and formulation o f [3].
priori distribution, o r in  term s o f  the jo in t probability:
V(X | Y) = ^  m a ? (P (y I x )p x  (x)) =  ^  m ax  P A (x, y)
yey yey
The multiplicative leakage is CX(C, P x)  = f ^ y 1 whereas 
the additive leakage is L+(C , P X ) = f V(X\Y) -  V(X).
D. Dining Cryptographers
This problem , described by Chaum  in [9], involves a sit­
uation in  w hich three cryptographers are dining together. At 
the end o f  the dinner, each o f  them  is secretly inform ed by  a 
central agency (master) w hether he should pay the bill, or not. 
So, either the m aster w ill pay, o r one o f  the cryptographers 
w ill be asked to pay. The cryptographers (or some external 
observer) would like to find out w hether the payer is one o f 
them  or the master. However, i f  the payer is one o f  them, they 
also w ish to m aintain anonym ity over the identity o f  the payer.
A  possible solution to this problem , described in  [9], is that 
each cryptographer tosses a coin, w hich is visible to him self 
and his neighbor to the left. E ach cryptographer observes the 
two coins that he can see and announces agree or disagree. If  
a cryptographer is not paying, he w ill announce agree i f  the 
two sides are the same and disagree i f  they are not. The paying 
cryptographer w ill say the opposite. It can be proved that if  
the num ber o f  disagrees is even, then the m aster is paying; 
otherwise, one o f  the cryptographers is paying. Furtherm ore 
-for the case o f  fair coins, i f  one o f  the cryptographers is 
paying, then neither an  external observer nor the other two 
cryptographers can identify, from  their individual inform ation, 
who exactly is paying. The D ining Cryptographers (DC) will 
be a  running example through the paper.
out0
Fig. 1. Chaum’s system for the Dining Cryptographers ([9])
III. S y s t e m s
In  this section we describe the kind o f  systems we are 
dealing with. We start by introducing a variant o f  probabilistic 
automata, that we call tagged probabilistic automata. These 
systems are parallel com positions o f  purely probabilistic p ro­
cesses, that we call components. They are equipped w ith  a
4unique identifier, that we call tag, o r label, o f  the component. 
Note that, because o f  the restriction that the com ponents 
are fully determ inistic2, nondeterm inism  is generated only 
from  the interleaving o f  the parallel com ponents. Furtherm ore, 
because o f  the uniqueness o f  the tags, each transition from  a 
node is associated to a different tag /  pair o f  two tags (one in 
case only one com ponent makes a  step, and two in  case o f  a 
synchronization step am ong two components).
A. Tagged Probabilistic Automata
We now form alize the notion o f  TPA.
D efinition 1. A tagged probabilistic autom aton (TPA) is a 
tuple (Q , L , E , q, 0), where
• Q is a set o f  states,
• L  is a set o f  tags, or labels,
• E  is a set o f  actions,
• q e  Q is the initial state,
• 0: Q ^  P ( L  x D (E  x Q )) is a transition function. 
with the additional requirement that for every q e  Q and 
every I  e  L  there is at most one ^  e  D (E  x Q ) such that 
( l , M) e  0 (q) .
A  path  fo r a  TPA is a sequence a  =  q0 — qi q2 • • •. 
In  this way, the process w ith  identifier l* induces the system 
to move from  qi - 1  to q* perform ing the action a*, and it does 
so w ith  probability ^ ( a ^ q * ) ,  where ^  is the distribution 
associated to the choice made by the com ponent l*. Finite 
paths and com plete paths are defined in  a  sim ilar manner.
In  a TPA, the scheduler’s choice is determ ined by the choice 
o f  the tag. We will use enab(q) to denote the tags o f  the 
com ponents that are enabled to make a transition. Namely,
enab(q) d= f { I e  L  | 3 Me D ( E  x Q ) : ( l , M) e  0(q)} (1)
We assume that the scheduler is forced to select a com po­
nent am ong those w hich are enabled, i.e., that the execution 
does not stop unless all com ponents are blocked (suspended or 
term inated). This is in  line w ith  the spirit o f  process algebra, 
and also w ith the tradition o f  M arkov D ecision Processes, but 
contrasts w ith that o f  the Probabilistic A utom ata o f  Lynch 
and Segala [30]. However, the results in  this paper do not 
depend on this assum ption; we could as w ell allow schedulers 
w hich decide to term inate the execution even though there are 
transitions w hich are possible from  the last state.
D efinition 2. A scheduler for a TPA M  =  (Q, L, E , q, 0) is a 
function Z : P a th s * (M ) ^  (L  U { ± } ) such that for all finite 
paths a, Z (a) e  enab(last (a ))  i f  enab (last (a ) )  =  0 and 
Z(a) =  ±  otherwise.
B. Components
To specify the com ponents we use a  sort o f  probabilistic 
version o f  CCS [24], [25]. We assume a set o f  secret actions 
E S w ith  elem ents s, s 1, s2, • • •, and a disjoint set o f  observable
2In [1] we extend our framework by allowing nondeterministic choices in 
the components, and we use an additional scheduler to handle such “internal” 
nondeterminism.
actions E O w ith  elem ents a , a 1, a 2, • • •. Furtherm ore we have 
communication actions, w hich are also observable, o f  the form  
c(x) (receive x  on channel c, where x  is a form al parameter), 
o r c(v) (send v on  channel c, where v is a value on  some 
dom ain V). Sometimes we need only to synchronize w ithout 
transm itting any value, in  w hich case we w ill use sim ply c 
and c. We denote the set o f  channel nam es by C .
A  com ponent q is specified by the follow ing grammar:
C om ponents
:= 0
a.q
£ i  Pi 
£ i  Pi
i f  x  =  
A
qi
«¿.qi
v then qi else q2
term ination 
observable prefix 
b lind  choice 
secret choice 
conditional 
process call
O bservables
c | c
c(x) | c(v)
sim ple synchronization 
synchronization and com m unication
The p j, in  the b lind  and secret choices, represents the 
probability o f  the i-th  b ranch and m ust satisfy 0 <  p* <  1 and 
Pi =  1. W hen no confusion arises, we use simply +  fo r a 
binary choice. The process call A  is a sim ple process identifier. 
F or each o f  them, we assum e a  corresponding unique process
def
declaration o f  the form  A  =  q. The idea is that, w henever 
A  is executed, it triggers the execution o f  q. N ote that q can 
contain A  o r another process identifier, w hich m eans that our 
language allows (m utual) recursion.
We rem ark once again  that each com ponent contains only 
probabilistic and sequential constructs. In  particular, there is 
no internal parallelism . Hence each com ponent corresponds to 
a purely probabilistic autom aton (apart from  the input nonde­
term inism , w hich disappears in the definition o f  a  system), as 
described by the operational semantics below.
Components' semantics: The operational semantics consists o f 
probabilistic transitions o f  the form  q ^ ^  where q G Q is a 
process, and ^  G D (E  x Q) is a  distribution on actions and 
processes. They are specified by the follow ing rules:
PRF1
PRF2
INT
SECR
v G V
c(x ).q  ^  ¿(c(v), q[v/x])
a.q  ^  ¿ (a , q)
if  a  =  c(x)
„■TT q * ^  • -C /1 defCALL --------------  i f  A  = q
A ^  ^
q
a  :: =
5CND1 --------------------------------------------- ;-----------
i f  v =  v then qi else ^  £ ( t, qi)
v =  v '
CND2 --------------------------- ------------------ ;---------
i f  v =  v ' then qi else q2 ^  J ( t ,  q2)
◦  i p i • ^  is the distribution ^  such that ^ (x )  =  ^ i p i^ i (x). 
We use J (x ) to represent the delta o f  Dirac, w hich assigns 
probability 1 to x. The silent action, t , is a special action 
different from  all the observable and the secret actions. q[v/x] 
stands fo r the process q in w hich any occurrence o f  x  has 
been  replaced by v. To shorten the notation, in  the examples 
throughout the paper, we om it w riting explicit term ination, i.e., 
we om it the symbol 0 at the end o f  a term.
C. Systems
A  system  consists o f  n  processes (com ponents) in  parallel, 
and restricted at the top-level on  the set o f  channel nam es C:
(C ) qi II q2 || ••• || qn.
The restriction on C  enforces synchronization (and possibly 
com m unication) on  the channel nam es belonging to C , in 
accordance w ith the C C s  spirit. s ince  C  is the set o f  all 
channels, all o f  them  are forced to synchronize. This is 
to eliminate, a t the level o f  systems, the nondeterm inism  
generated by the rule fo r the receive prefix, PRF1.
Systems' semantics: The semantics o f  a  system  gives rise to a 
TPA, where the states are term s representing systems during
I
their evolution. A  transition now is o f  the form  q 4  ^  where 
^  G (D (E  x Q )) and l  G L  is either the identifier o f  the 
com ponent w hich makes the move, o r a  tw o-elem ent set o f 
identifiers representing the two partners o f  a  synchronization. 
The follow ing two rules (INT) and (SYNC/COM M ) provide 
the operational sem antics rules in  the case o f  interleaving and 
synchronisation/com m unication, respectively.
(INT) I f  G C
®  E j P j  ■à { . a j , q i j )
(C) qi II • • • I I ® Il •••II
◦ j P j  • ¿ (« j>(C ) qi II • • • 1 qij II • • • 1 qn)
where i indicates the tag o f  the com ponent m aking the step. 
(SYNC/COM M )
________ ® S{c(v), q'j) qj -> 6{c{v), q ' )________
(C ) qi | | ^ | |  qi I I - - -H qn ^
¿ (t , (C ) qi ! • • • !  qj ! • • • !  qj || ••• || qn)
here {i, j }  is the tag indicating that the com ponents m aking 
the step are i and j .  F or simplicity we write instead of 
—4 .  The rule fo r synchronization w ithout com m unication is
similar, the only difference is that we do not have (v) and (v) 
in  the actions. Note that c can only be an  observable action 
(neither a secret nor t ), by the assum ption that channel names 
can only be observable actions.
We note that bo th  interleaving and synchronization rules 
generate nondeterminism. The only other source o f  nondeter­
m inism  is PRF1, the rule fo r a receive prefix c(x). H owever 
the latter is not real nondeterminism: it is introduced in  the 
semantics o f  the com ponents but it disappears in  the semantics 
o f  the systems, given that the channel c is restricted at the top- 
level. In  fact the restriction enforces com m unication, and w hen 
com m unication takes place, only the branch  corresponding to 
the actual value v transm itted by the corresponding send action 
is maintained, all the others disappear.
P ro p o sitio n  1. The operational semantics o f a system is a 
TPA with the following characteristics:
(a) Every step q p  is either
a blind  choice: p  =  ◦  * p* • ¿ ( t ,  q*), or
a secret choice: p  =  ◦  * p* • ¿(s*, q*), or
a delta o f  Dirac: p  =  ¿ (a ,  q ') with a  e  E O o r  a  =  t .
(b) I f  q p  and q p  then p  =  p '.
E xam ple  1. We now present the com ponents fo r the D ining 
Cryptographers using the introduced syntax. They correspond 
to Figure 1 and to the autom ata depicted in  Figure 3. 
As announced before, we om it the sym bol 0 fo r explicit 
term ination at the end o f  each term. The secret actions 
s* represent the choice o f  the payer. The operators ©, Q 
represent the sum  m odulo 2 and the difference m odulo 2 , 
respectively. The test i = =  n  returns 1 (true) if  i =  n , 
and 0 otherwise. The set o f  restricted channel nam es is 
C =  {co,o, co,i, c i ,i ,  ci 2, c2,o, c2,2, mo, m i,  m 2}.
M aster = f p : mo (0) . m i (0) . m 2 (0) +
(1 -  P ) : Z l o  P* : s* •
mn(* = =  0} .m i(*  = =  1} . m 2(* = =  2}
Crypt* d=f m*(pay) • c*,* (co in i)  • c ^ ^ c o i ^ )  • 
out* (pay © co in i © co in 2)
Coin* d=f 0 .5 :  cM (0) • ci© iji(0) +  0 .5 : c*,*(1) • ci© iji(1)
Sy stem  d= f (C ) M aster || n ?= o  Crypt* II n 2=o Coin*
Fig. 2. Dining Cryptographers CCS
The operation pay © c o in i © co in 2 in  F igure 2 is syntactic 
sugar, it can be defined using the if-then-else operator. Note 
that, in  this way, if  a cryptographer is not paying (pay = 0), 
then he announces 0 i f  the two coins are the same (agree) and 
1 i f  they are not (disagree).
IV. A d m is s ib l e  Sc h e d u l e r s  
We now introduce the class o f  adm issible schedulers.
6M aster Coin, Crypt,
mo(0) mo(1)
•
m 0 (0) —  / n\ Ci A 0) mo{ 0) 1
» •
m i(0)
m2 (0)
m i(0) CiQ 1
,i(1)
ciQ 1 ( 1 )
outi(0) outi(1)
Fig. 3. Dining Cryptographers Automata
Standard (full-inform ation) schedulers have access to all 
the inform ation about the system  and its com ponents, and in 
particular the secret choices. Hence, such schedulers can leak 
secrets by m aking their decisions depend on  the secret choice 
o f  the system. This is the case w ith  the D ining Cryptographers 
protocol o f  Section II-D: am ong all possible schedulers fo r the 
protocol, there are several that leak the identity o f  the payer 
In  fact the scheduler has the freedom  to decide the order o f 
the announcem ents o f  the cryptographers (interleaving), so a 
scheduler could choose to le t the payer announce lastly. In 
this way, the attacker learns the identity o f  the payer simply 
by looking at the interleaving o f  the announcem ents.
Figure 4 shows the sequence o f  screens corresponding to a 
particular sequence o f  choices taken by the scheduler3. Inter­
leaving and com m unication options are represented by yellow  
and red buttons, respectively. A n arrow betw een two screens 
represents the transition from  one to the other (produced by the 
scheduler pressing a button), additionally, the decision taken 
by the scheduler and corresponding outputs are depicted above 
each arrow.
{ 1,2 } : t {1.3}:-
T
A. The screens intuition
L et us first describe adm issible schedulers informally. As 
m entioned in  the introduction, adm issible schedulers can base 
their decisions only on partial inform ation about the evolution 
o f the system, in  particular adm issible schedulers cannot base 
their decisions on inform ation concerned w ith  the internal 
behavior o f  com ponents (such as secret choices).
We follow  the subsequent intuition: adm issible schedulers 
are entities that have access to a screen w ith  buttons, where 
each bu tton  represents one (current) available option. A t each 
point o f  the execution the scheduler decides the next step 
am ong the available options (by pressing the corresponding 
button). Then (if any) the output o f  the selected com ponent 
becom es available to the scheduler and the screen is refreshed 
w ith  the new available options (the ones corresponding to the 
system  after m aking the selected step). We im pose that the 
scheduler can  base its decisions only on such information, 
namely: the screens and outputs he has seen up to that point 
o f the execution (and, o f course, the decisions he has made). 
E xam ple 2. Consider S  =  ({c i, C2}) qi || q2 1| q3 , where
dgf _ _ _ _
qi =  0.5 : S1.c1.c2 +  0.5 : s 2-ci.c2,
q2 = f c i .(0 .5  : a i  +  0.5 : b i), q3 = f C2.(0.5 : a.2 +  0.5 : 62).
2:ai ■ 1  3:a2 ~L_J ~
Fig. 4. Screens intuition
N ote that this system  has exactly the same problem  as the 
D C protocol: a full-inform ation scheduler could reveal the 
secret by basing the interleaving order (q2 first or q3 first) on 
the secret choice o f  the com ponent qi . However, the same does 
not hold anym ore for adm issible schedulers (the scheduler 
cannot deduce the secret choice by ju s t looking at the screens 
and outputs). This is also the case for the D C protocol, i.e., 
adm issible schedulers cannot leak the secret o f the protocol.
B. The formalization
Before form ally defining adm issible schedulers we need to 
form alize the ingredients o f  the screens intuition. The buttons 
on the screen (available options) are the enabled options 
given by the function enab (see ( 1)), the decision made
3The transitions from screens 4 and 5 represent 2 steps each (for simplicity 
we omit the T-steps generated by blind choices)
7by the scheduler is the tag o f  the selected enabled option, 
observable actions are obtained by sifting the secret actions to 
the schedulers by means o f  the follow ing function:
where
sift (a ) def
a  if  a  G S o U {t }, 
T if  a  G S s  .
D efinition 3. Let q
system, then we define t as:
t  q qn+1
def
defined as
te (qo
li ,a i
t e : P a th s*  ( S ) ^  O e
q„+i^ = f sieve( a i )  • • • sieve( a n )
sieve (a ) def
a  if  a  G S o , 
e if  a  G S s  U {t }.
The partial inform ation o f a  certain  evolution o f the system is 
given by the m ap t  defined as follows.
ll  ,ai In
qn+1 be a finite path o f the
(enab (q), l i ,  sift ( a i ) )
(enab(q „ ) ,l„ ,  sift(a „ )) .
Finally, we have all the ingredients needed to define adm is­
sible schedulers.
D efinition 4 (A dm issible schedulers). A scheduler Z is 
admissible i f  for all a , a '  G P aths*
t( a )  =  t ( a ')  implies Z (a) =  Z (a ').
In  this way, adm issible schedulers are forced to take the 
same decisions on paths that they cannot tell apart. Note 
that this is a restriction on the original definition o f  (full- 
inform ation) schedulers where t  is the identity map over 
finite paths (and consequently the scheduler is free to choose 
differently).
V. In f o r m a t io n -h id in g  p r o p e r t ie s  in  p r e s e n c e  of
NONDETERMINISM
In this section we revise the standard definition o f  infor­
m ation flow and anonym ity in  our fram ew ork o f  controlled 
nondeterm inism .
We first consider the notion o f  adversary. We consider three 
possible notions o f  adversaries, increasingly more powerful.
A. Adversaries
External adversaries: Clearly, an  adversary should be able, 
by definition, to see at least the observable actions. For an 
adversary external to the system  S , it is natural to assume 
that these are also the only actions that he is supposed to see. 
Therefore, we define the observation domain, fo r an external 
adversary, as the set o f  the (finite) sequences o f  observable 
actions, namely:
Oe d=  £*0 .
Correspondingly, we need a function that extracts the observ­
ables from  the executions:
Internal adversaries: A n internal adversary may be able to see, 
besides the observables, also the intearleaving and synchro­
nizations o f  the various com ponents, i.e. w hich com ponent(s) 
are active, at each step o f  the execution. Hence it is natural 
to define the observation domain, fo r an internal adversary, as 
the sequence o f  pairs o f  observable action and tag (i.e. the 
identifier(s) o f  the active com ponent(s)), namely:
O i = f (L  x ( S o U { t }))*.
Correspondingly, we need a function that extracts the observ­
ables from  the executions:
defined as
t i qo
defqn+i I = ( l i ,  sieve ( a i ) ) î( a „ ) ) .
Note that in  this definition we could have equivalently used 
sift instead than sieve.
Adversaries in collusion with the scheduler: Finally, we con­
sider the case in  w hich the adversary is in  collusion w ith the 
scheduler, o r possibly the adversary is the scheduler, like in 
the Dolev-Yao model. H ere the observation dom ain coincides 
w ith  the one o f  the scheduler:
O s d=  (P (L )  x L  x ( S o U {t }))*.
The corresponding function
t s : P a th s* (S ) ^  O s 
is defined as the one o f  the scheduler, i.e. t s =  t.
B. Information leakage
In  Inform ation Flow and Anonym ity there is a converging 
consensus for form alizing the notion o f  leakage as the dif­
ference or the ratio betw een the a priori uncertainty that the 
adversary has about the secret, and the a  posteriori uncertainty, 
that is, the residual uncertainty o f  the adversary once it has 
seen the outcom e o f  the computation. The uncertainty can 
be m easured in  different ways. One popular approach is the 
inform ation-theoretic one, according to w hich the system  is 
seen as a noisy channel betw een the secret inputs and the 
observable output, and uncertainty corresponds to the Shannon 
entropy o f  the system  (see prelim inaries, section B). In  this 
approach, the leakage is represented by the so-called m utual 
inform ation, w hich expresses the correlation betw een the input 
and the output.
The above approach, however, has been  recently criticized 
by Sm ith [31], who has argued that Shannon entropy is not 
suitable to represent the security threats in  the typical case in  
w hich the adversary is interested in  figuring out the the secret 
in  one-try attem pt, and he has proposed to use R enyi’s min 
entropy instead, o r equivalently, the average probability o f  suc­
ceeding. This leads to interpret the uncertainty in  term s o f  the
a
n
8notion o f  vulnerability defined in  the prelim inaries, section C. 
The corresponding notion o f  leakage, in  the pure probabilistic 
case, have been  investigated in  [31] (multiplicative case) and 
in  [3] (additive case).
H ere we adopt the vulnerability-based approach to define 
the notion  o f  leakage in  our probabilistic and nondeterm in- 
istic context. The Shannon-entropy-based approach could be 
extended to our context as well, because in  both cases we only 
need to specify how  to determ ine the conditional probabilities 
w hich constitute the channel matrix, and the marginal proba­
bilities that constitute the input and the output distribution.
We will denote by S  the random  variable associated to 
the set o f  secrets S  =  , and by O x the random  variables 
associated to the set o f  observables O x, w here x  G {e, i, s}. So, 
O x represents the observation dom ains fo r the various kinds 
o f  adversaries defined above.
o u r  results require som e structural properties fo r the system: 
we assum e that there is a single com ponent in  the system  
containing a secret choice and this com ponent contains a single 
secret choice. This hypothesis is general enough to allow 
expressing protocols like the D ining Cryptographers, Crowds, 
voting protocols, etc., where the secret is chosen only once.
A ssum ption  1. A system contains exactly one component with 
a syntactic occurrence o f a secret choice, and such a choice 
does not occur in the scope o f any recursive call.
N ote that the assum ption im plies that the choice appears 
exactly once in  the operational semantics o f  the com ponent. 
It w ould be possible to relax the assum ption and allow more 
than one secret choice in  a com ponent, as long as there are 
no observable actions betw een the secret choices. B ut fo r the 
sake o f  sim plicity in  this paper we im pose the m ore restrictive 
requirem ent. As a  consequence, we have that the operational 
semantics o f  systems satisfies the follow ing property:
I / I  /P ro p o sitio n  2. I f  q p  and q ' ^  p ' are both secret choices,
then I  =  I '  and there exist p * ’s, q* ’s and q i ’s such that:
i.e., p  and p ' differ only for the continuation states.
G iven a system, each scheduler Z determ ines a fully prob­
abilistic automaton, and, as a consequence, the probabilities
P c (s, o) =  P c  U  \  (a) | ^  G P a th s * (S ),
\  [  t æ(a ) =  o, secr(a ) =  s
fo r each secret s G S  and observable o G O x, w here x  G 
{e, i, s}. Here secr is the m ap from  paths to their secret action. 
F rom  these we can derive, in  standard ways, the marginal 
probabilities P z  (s), P z  (o), and the conditional probabilities
P c (o | s).
We have that the probabilities o f  the secrets are actually 
independent from  the scheduler:
P ro p o sitio n  3. Given a system, for every pair o f schedulers 
Z and Z  we have that P z  (s) =  P z ' (s), for every secret s.
Because o f  the previous proposition, we can om it Z in  P z .
Every scheduler leads to a (generally different) noisy chan­
nel, whose m atrix is determ ined by the conditional probabili­
ties as follows:
D efinition 5. Let x  G {e, i, s}. Given a system and a scheduler 
Z, the corresponding channel matrix CX has rows indexed by 
s G S  and columns indexed by o G Ox . The value in (s, o) is
given by P c (o | s) d=
Given a scheduler Z, the multiplicative leakage can be 
defined as L x (C X ,P s), w hile the additive leakage can be 
defined as £ + (C X ,P s) where P S is the a priori distribution 
on the set o f secrets (see prelim inaries, section C). However, 
we w ant a notion o f leakage independent from  the scheduler, 
and therefore it is natural to consider the w orst case over all 
possible adm issible schedulers.
D efinition 6 (x -leakage). Let x  G {e, i, s}. Given a system, 
the multiplicative leakage is defined as
M L x ( C X ,P s ) =  m ax  £ x (C X ,P s),Z G A  d m
while the additive leakage is defined as
M L + (C X ,P s ) =  m ax  L + (C X ,P s),Z G A dm
where Adm is the class ofadmissible schedulers defined in the 
previous section.
We have that the classes o f observables e, i, and s determine 
an  increasing degree o f leakage:
P ro p o sitio n  4. Given a system, for the multiplicative leakage 
we have
M L x ( C e ,P s ) < M L x ( C Z ,P s ) < M L x ( C Z ,P S ). 
Similarly for the additive leakage.
C. Strong anonymity (revised)
We consider now the situation in  w hich the leakage is 
the m inim um  fo r all possible adm issible schedules. In  the 
purely probabilistic case, we know  that the m inim um  possible 
multiplicative leakage is 1 , and the m inim um  possible additive 
one is 0. We also know  that this is the case for all possible 
input distributions if and only if the capacity o f the channel 
m atrix is 0, w hich corresponds to the case in  w hich the rows of 
the m atrix are all the same. This corresponds to the notion of 
strong probabilistic anonym ity defined in  [2]. In  the fram ework 
o f  inform ation flow, it w ould correspond to probabilistic non­
interference. Still in  [2], the authors considered also the 
extension o f this notion in  presence o f nondeterminism, and 
required the condition to hold under all possible schedulers. 
This is too strong in  practice, as we have argued in  the 
introduction: in  m ost cases we can  build  a scheduler that leaks 
the secret by changing the interleaving order. We therefore 
tune this notion by requiring the condition to hold only under 
the adm issible schedulers.
D efinition 7 (x -strong ly  anonym ous). Let x  G {e, i, s}. We
say that a system is x-strongly-anonym ous i f  for all admissible 
schedulers Z we have
P C (o 1 s i ) =  P C (o 1 s 2)
9The follow ing corollary is an  im m ediate consequence of 
previous proposition.
C o ro lla ry  8.
1) I f  a system is s-strongly-anonymous, then it is also i- 
strongly-anonymous.
2) I f  a system is i-strongly-anonymous, then it is also e- 
strongly-anonymous.
The converse o f  point (2), in  previous the corollary, does 
not hold, as shown by the follow ing example:
def
E xam ple  3. Consider the system S  =  ({c i, c2}) P  || Q || T  
where
P  = f (0.5 : si : ci)+ (0.5 : s2 : c2) Q  = f c\ : o T  = f c2 : o.
It is easy to check that S  is e -strongly anonymous but 
not i -strongly anonymous, showing that (as expected) internal 
adversaries can “distinguish more ” than external adversaries.
O n the contrary, fo r point (1) o f  Corollary 8 , also the other 
direction holds:
P ro p o sitio n  5. A system is s-strongly-anonymous i f  and only 
i f  it is e-strongly-anonymous.
V I. O n  t h e  v e r if ic a t io n  o f  s t r o n g  a n o n y m it y : a
PROVING TECHNIQUE BASED ON AUTOMORPHISMS
As m entioned in  the introduction, several problem s in ­
volving restricted schedulers have been  show n undecidable 
(including com puting m axim um /m inim um  probabilities fo r the 
case o f  standard m odel checking [18], [17]). These results 
are discouraging in  the aim  to find algorithms for verifying 
strong anonym ity/non-interference using our notion o f  ad ­
missible schedulers (and most definitions based on  restricted 
schedulers). D espite the fact that the problem  seems to be 
undecidable in  general, in  this section we present a sufficient 
(but not necessary) anonym ity proving technique: we show 
that the existence o f  autom orphism s betw een pair o f  secrets 
implies strong anonymity.
A. The proving technique
In  practice proving anonym ity often happens in  the follow ­
ing way. G iven a trace in  w hich user A  is the ‘culprit’, we 
construct an observationally equivalent trace in  w hich user B  
is the ‘culprit’ [20], [16], [23], [21]. This new trace is typically 
obtained by ‘sw itching’ the behavior o f  users A  and B . We 
form alize this idea by using the notion o f  autom orphism , cf. 
e.g. [27].
D efinition 9 (A utom orphism ). Given a TPA (Q ,L , S , q, 0) 
we say that a bijection f  : Q ^  Q is an autom orphism  i f  it 
satisfies f  (q) =  q and
q S / i  • ^ ( a i ’ q ^  f  (q) S / i  • ^ ( a i ’ f  (q ^). 
i i
In  order to prove anonym ity it is enough (but not necessary) 
to prove that the behaviors o f  any two ’culprits’ can  be
for all s i ,  s 2 G S s , and o G Ox . exchanged w ithout the adversary noticing. We will express this 
in  the Theorem  1 by means o f  the existence o f  autom orphism s 
that exchange a given pair o f  secret s* and s j .
o u r  proving technique requires A ssum ption 1. Before pre­
senting the m ain theorem  o f this section we need to introduce 
one last definition. L et S  =  (C ) q1 1| • • • || qn be a system  and 
M  its corresponding TPA. We define M T as the autom aton 
obtained after “hiding” all the secret actions o f  M . The idea 
is to replace every occurrence o f  a secret s in  M  by the 
silent action t  . N ote that this can be form alized by replacing 
the secret choice by a b lind  choice in  the corresponding 
com ponent qi o f  the system  S.
We can  now state the relation betw een autom orphism s and 
strong anonymity.
T heorem  1. Let S  be a system that satisfies Assumption 1 
and M  its tagged probabilistic automaton. I f  for every pair 
o f secrets s i; Sj G S s  there exists an automorphism f  o f  M T 
such that for any state q we have
q — +m  q' = ^  f  (q) —^ m  f  (q'),
then S  is s-strongly-anonymous.
N ote that, since s-strong anonym ity implies i-strong 
anonym ity and e-strong anonymity, the existence o f  such an 
autom orphism  implies all the notions o f  strong anonymity 
presented in  this work.
P ro p o sitio n  6. The converse does not hold, i.e. strong 
anonymity does not imply the existence o f automorphisms.
We now show that the definition o f  x-strong-anonym ity is 
independent o f  the particular distribution over secrets, i.e., i f  
a system  is x-strongly-anonym ous fo r a  particular distribution 
over secrets, then it is x-strongly-anonym ous fo r all distribu­
tions over secrets.
T heorem  2. Consider a system S  =  (C ) q1 || • • • || qi || • • • || 
qn . Let qi be the component which contains the secret choice, 
and assume that it is o f the form ^ j  p j  : s j  . q j . Consider 
now the system S ' =  (C ) q1 || • • • || q| || • • • || qn, where q' is 
identical to qi except for the secret choice, which is replaced 
byY_I j  p j  : Sj . q j . Then we have that:
1) For every s*, Sj there is an automorphism on S  satisfying 
the assumption o f Theorem 1 i f  and only i f  the same holds 
for S '.
2) S  is x-strongly-anonymous i f  and only i f  S ' is x-strongly- 
anonymous.
Note: 1) does not imply 2), because in principle neither S  
not S ' may have the automorphism, and still one o f the two 
could be strongly anonymous.
B. An Application: Dining Cryptographers
Now  we show how to apply the proving technique pre­
sented in  this section to the D ining Cryptographers protocol. 
Concretely, we show that there exists an autom orphism  f  ex­
changing the behavior o f  the Crypto and C rypt1; by symmetry, 
the same holds fo r the other two com binations.
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mo(Q)
•
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Fig. 5. Automorphism between Crypto and Crypti
Consider the autom orphism s o f  M aster and C oini indicated 
in  Figure 5. The states that are not explicitly m apped (by a 
dotted arrow) are m apped to themselves.
Also consider the identity autom orphism  on  Crypti (for i =  
0 ,1 , 2) and on  Coini (for i =  0, 2). It is easy to check that the 
product o f  these seven autom orphism s is an  autom orphism  for 
C rypt0 and Crypt 1.
V II. C o n c l u s i o n  a n d  f u t u r e  w o r k
We have defined a class o f  partial-inform ation schedulers 
w hich can  only base their decisions on the inform ation they 
have available. In  particular they cannot base their decisions 
on the internal behavior o f  the components.
We have used adm issible schedulers to resolve nondeter­
minism  in  a realistic way, and to tune the definition o f  strong 
anonym ity proposed in  [2].
We have presented a technique to prove the various def­
initions o f  strong anonym ity proposed in  the paper. This is 
particularly interesting considering that many problem s related 
to restricted schedulers have been show n to be undecidable. 
In  particular we have show n how to use the technique to 
prove that the D C protocol is strongly anonym ous w hen 
considering adm issible schedulers, in  contrast to the situation 
w hen considering full-inform ation schedulers.
We p lan  to investigate the decidability problem  fo r the 
various definitions o f  strong anonym ity we have proposed. 
A nother interesting direction fo r future w ork is to extend well 
know n isom orphism -checking algorithm s and tools (see [15] 
fo r a survey) to our setting in  order to verify automatically 
strong anonym ity (in case an  autom orphism  exists - recall that 
this is not a necessary condition).
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